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LEGAL E'I'HICS
THE CANONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

here is a discussion of (I) the meaning of "ethics"
M y inofpurpose
a professional sense, and (2) the relation to the subject
the "Canons of Ethics" of the American Bar Association.
I have before me a valuable booklet1 in which the author opposes,
in one chapter, ''Ethical Instruction in the Schools" and, in the
other chapter, he favors "Moral Instruction in the Schools." In
his use of words, "ethical" means theory, a science, while "moral"
means habits, an art. He persuasively opposes, therefore, the
"ethical" while contending for the "moral."
It is the author's nomenclature only that interests me at present.
If by "ethics" is meant the science of conduct, and by Legal Ethics
that science in its professional relations, I lose any large interest in
the subject. Human conduct as a" science, and Codes of Ethics and
Systems of Philosophy have their place (one doubtless of large
value) in a study of the history of philosophy. 2 Habits, memories
of conduct, traditions, are the important matters for the professional
man.
The more or less prevalent idea that Ethics is a learned science,
which is of interest only to the scholar, has something to do with the
absence of ethics in the professions.8
1 The author of this booklet was George Herbert Palmer, Alford Professor in Har·
vard University. It was published by the Houghton, Mifflin ColJlPany In J910, as one of
the Riverside Educational Monographs, with the title "Ethical and Moral Instruction in
Schools." The book was written to counteract the tendency of some educational thinkers
who believe "that in direct and systematic ethical teaching in the class room lies the best
means of enlarging the moral influence of the school." The thesis of Professor Palmer's
book is nowhere better demonstrated.
• I think that a reading of the names of courses offered in Ethics in any of our
universities illustrates the text, and will especially impress one that philosophic learning
is not necessarily an aid to right living.
The following are taken from a University Calendar of 1917:
(1) History of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle.
(2) Kant, Hegel and Anglo-American Idealism after 1865.
(3) The Philosophy of Plato.
(4) German Pessimism in the 19th Century. A detailed study of the works of
Schopenhauer, von Hartman, and Nietzche, with reference not only to their philosoph·
ical but also to their general literary and social significance.
(S) Pragmatism. A critical study of the contemporary movement in Angla.
American Philosophy, in its two main lines of development.
(6) Political Philosophy. A history of the theories of society, ancient and
modem. Attention will be given especially to the contract theory of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.
(7) Contemporary Ethical Problems.
•A remarkable article, which in my judgment is here pertinent, appeared in the April,
1914, Atlantic Monthly. The author was H. Fielding-Ha!L I understand that what he
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As a science "Ethics" lacks inspiration. Limited to rules of conduct, the subject is dry and uninteresting. But human conduct
(applied ethics) is life itself. iWith this meaning ethics covers the
whole range of art, and is more interesting and instructive than
history. The novel and the drama are but the reflection of human
conduct ; that is, ethics.
This is the meaning with which I use "Ethic~" in my ~tle. And
there is much authority for this use of the word. I need refer only
to the several books resulting from the Page Lecture Series at
Yale. The purpose of the foundation was the "dealing with the
question of right conduct in business matters." We are indebted to
the Page Foundation for Taft's "Ethics in Service." Therein is
quoted, attributed to 1Arisfotle"It is the function of Ethics, to act; not only to theorize."
Very much as a community is admirable because of its ethical
habits, its morals, rather than because of its wealth, or its advancement in scientific pursuits, so is a 'profession really distinguished by
its ethics, its traditions, its memories of conduct, rather than by its
intellectual attainments.
What a man does in action, and under temptation, is of more
importance, and has more influence upon his fellows, than what he
thinks or advises. We need mention only the name, Erskine, to
realize the influence upon the English Bar, and upon history itself,
resulting, not from Erskine's eloquence so much as from his fearless, nay, hazardous, conduct in maintaining the right as he saw it.
I am not sure but that the remarkable influence of Socrates
through the ages has been due more to what he did than to what he
taught.4
writes Is highly regarded where the English language is known, and especially in India
and the Home Country. The title which he took, itself challenges attention: "The Fal·
lacy of Ethics." I refrain from describing the author's argument, but in showing that no
rule of conduct is of universal application (which he does very effectively), it appears to
me that Fielding·Hall treats his subject from the same point of view as does Professor
Palmer, namely, that by Ethics we mean a science. I am inclined to think that, with this
meaning in mind, the title to the author's article is well taken. But if he had in mind,
w:&en he chose the title that the word Ethics connoted an art, or human conduct, his
article would, in my judgment, not have been written.
4 Of course I am referring in the text especially to the death of Socrates.
Plato's
Dialogue, "The Crito," advises us of Socrates' attitude toward the matter. From history
we know that he went to his death. He had been accused before the Athenian people on
charges which seemed to his friends at that time, as they do to us, to have been un·
founded, both in law and in fact, and yet, as we learn from Plato's dialogue, "The
Apology," he had been condemned to duth. It was only a day or two before his end
that Crito visits Socrates early in the morning, and tries to persuade him to escape.
There is no question but that the escape could have been safely effected. Socrates refuses
to go, and he silences Crito's argument to the contrary, by showing that it was the duty
of Socrates to obey the law, and that for him to escape after judgment had been passed
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Rules, canons of ethics, alone, cannot determine the value of. professional conduct. Except in flagrant cases, in an ethical sense, it is
not the thing done, ·but rather the spirit prompting the act which is
important.5
Human conduct, from the ethical point of view, is best, when it is
intuitive; that is, when it is the unreasoned expression of fixed
habits. On the other hand, it is weak and unconvincing (even if
correct) when it waits upon reason or argument.
Not altogether dissimilar to our physical habits, such as walking
or eating, is that of our ethical conduct.6
All of these matters are learned in early life, perhaps in infancy.
They thereupon become habits, which, whether good or bad, are
confirmed by daily repetition. They can rarely be changed after
maturity.
I wish to make these general statements clear, and, to avoid misapprehension, I illustrate by reference to the lawyer's conduct in his
relations with the Court.
What standard of ethics has the lawyer who will stop to reason
with himself, or with a committee on professional ethics, as to how
far he should be candid with the Court? Of course he should not
lie to the Court, but is it not within the rule of ethics to ref rain
from explaining to the Court that a case in his brief has been overruled; or to omit to set the Judge right when, without the fault of
the lawyer, the Court is under a misapprehension as to the contents of the record? That lawyer is sound ethically who has no
occasion to reason with himself, and certainly not to consult authorities, when such a question arises. Having absorbed the highest
upon him would be an act of disloyalty to Athena. At the present day this attitude
towards courts, and the administration of justice, is perhaps what is most desired in the
lepl profession.
'The work of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York County Law·
ye~ Aaaociation illustrates. to lllY mind the text. This Committee has done a. remarkable
work in its painstaking consideration of )questions bearing upon professional conduct, and
the one hundred and fifty, or thereabouts, Questions and Answers form a booklet of
great value on Legal Ethics. I think one will notice, however, in examining the work
of this Committee, a decided tendency (as the work of the Committee progressed), in
answering a, question, to include limitaticins upon the scope of the answu.
•Palmer's book, referred to In Note 1 above, contains, on page u thereof, and in
illustration of his argument, which is not different from the text, the following nonsense
verse:
The centipede was happy, quite,
Until the toad for fun
Said, "Pray which leg comes after which?"
This worked her mind to such a pitch
She lay distracted in the ditch,
Considering how to run.
Theft is more sense in this verse, and in the application of it to Ethics, than in many
Tolumes devoted to Ethics considered as a science.
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ideals of conduct in general from his early life (perhaps more than
we appreciate by inheritance from his forbears), and later having
acquired the ·best traditions of his profession, he acts as it were unconsciously, and he acts right, and refuses to be in any respect uncandid with the Court. Memories of conduct have made him what
he is, not rules of ethics.
·
Therein lies, in my judgment, the peculiar value of the Early
English legal education. The Inns of Court, and the contact between the benchers, representing the high ideals of the profession,
and those who were preparing for the Bar, resulted not only in a
lmowledge by the benchers of the character of the men who were
later to apply for admission to the Bar, but it also, unconsciously
perhaps, imbued the student with the best traditions of the profession.
The American Colonial Bar was more largely indebted to the
English Inns of Court than is generally understood. Previous to
the Revolution about one hundred and fifty lawyers from the
American Colonies had been admitted to the English Bar, upon
completion of residence and other requirements, of the Inns of
Court. A large proportion of these men were leaders in Revolutionary and other early American history.7
The Bar became the most influential body in the several States.
In 1835 DeTocqueville had this to say of the profession and its
relation to American life:
~'In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the
people are apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently
form tlie highest political class and the most cultivated circle
of society. They have therefore nothing to gain by innovation
which adds a conservative interest to their natural taste for
public order. I£ I were asked where I place the American
aristocracy, I should reply, without hesitation, that it is not
composed of the rich, who are united by no common tie, but
that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar."

Dissatisfaction with the laws and the administration of justice
(whether merited or not is for our purpose immaterial), was growing among our people and, due in part at least to the supposed special
privileges enjoyed by lawyers, the profession was assailed. The
people desired to have justice made so simple that every man might
be his own lawyer. The wave of democracy which swept the
'The text at this point is largely derived from the remarkable book by Charles War·
ren upon the "History of the American Bar," which was published by Little, Brown
& Co., in 19II.
·
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civilized world between 1840 and 1850 (resulting in revolutions in
Continental Europe), seems to have spent itself in this country
upon laws and lawyers.
In New York, the Constitution of 1846, and legislation consequent upon its adoption, introduced revolutionary changes in the
law. Affecting the legal profession directly were provisions making admissiov. to the bar popular, and removing restraints (which
time-honored traditions had created), upon the conduct of lawyers.
These laws were adopted (in large part copied from New York),
by other States.
In Michigan the Constitution of 1850 (Article VI, Sec. 24), contained the provision :
"Any suitor in any Court of this State shall have the right
to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper person,
or by an attorney or agent of his choice.''
The opinion by Justice -Marston, construing this clause, in Cobb
v. litdge of Superior Court, 43 Mich 289, contained a clear, and, to
us, convincing argument in favor of the conclusion of the Court
that the words "attorney or agent" in this section of the Constitution, had no other meaning than the word "attorney."
The proper administration of justice and the protection of the
public including the individual litigant compelled that interpretation.
The same language in the Indiana Constitution was there given
the interpretation which the words alone seem to call for..
Champerty and Maintenance were regarded both by Legislatures
and by Courts, as doctrines .unsuited to conditions in this country,
and, where not directly· abolished, were rendered innocuous as restraints upon the profession.
.
The experience of ages, represented by traditions of the bar in
every civilized country, was disregarded. The result of this tendency is expressed by John Brooks Leavitt, 'Esq., in his address in
19!0 in "Every Day Ethics," one of the Page Lecture Series, as
follows:
"Fifty years ago in our State and in most other States this
salutary rule was departed from, and because that departure
was not properly safeguarded, the scandals now known as
abuses of the contingent fee have sprung up, and our profession is grappling with their deteriorating influences, from which
we must rescue ourselves or we shall become a perfect byword
and scorn in the nation."
As a result of the foregoing, during the ensuing generation, in-dividualism prevailed in the profession. The only sanction for
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professional conduct was found in the Criminal law. For many
reasons, few were the cases when lawyers were punished for acts
prohibited ·by Statute. But the more weighty sanction for right
conduct in professional relations lies in the enforcement by the profession of its accepted traditions.
The influence (stronger than penal laws), for right conduct exerted ·by the habits or ideals of a community, and the wish of the
members thereof to conduct themselves, at least in good form
according to the accepted ideals of the community,8 is nowhere more
convincingly stated and illustrated than in Lord Haldane's address
on "Higher Nationality. A study in Law and Ethics," delivered
before the American Bar Association in I9I3 at Montreal (See
Vol. XXXVIII, Reports A. B. A., pp. 393-4I7).
Conditions, especially in the larger cities, became intolerable.
While it is usual, when reference is made to the loss of prestige
suffered by the profession during the generation of which we have
spoken, to dwell upon the lowering of intellectual standards, the
more important matter was the loss in ethical habits and in professional memories or traditions. The public itself demanded more
integrity among lawyers. The organization of the American Bar
Association in I878 marks, perhaps, the beginning of an effort by
1 Of course a profession such as the law comes within the idea of a "community," as
used in Lord Haldane's address. I have, as yet, been unable to secure a copy of the
poem of Sir Alfred Lyall to which be refers in illustration of bis line of thought. I
quote from page 406 of the volume cited in the text:
•

"The poem is ·called 'Theology in Extremis.' " and it describes the feelings of an
Englishman who had been taken prisoner by Mabometan rebels in the Indian mutiny.
He is fa.:e to face -with a cruel death. They Qffer- him his life if he wilt repeat something from the Koran. If be complies no one ls likely ever to bear of it, and be
will be free to return to England and the woman he loves. Moreover, and here is
the real point, he is not a believer in Christianity, so that it is no question of denying
his Saviour. What ought he~to do? Deliverance ls easy and the relief and adva~tage
would be unspeakably great. But be does not really hesitate, and every shadow of
doubt disappears when be bears his fellow-prisoner, a half-caste, pattering eagerly the
words demanded. He himself has no hope of heaven and he loves life:
'Yet for the honor of England's race
May I not live and endure disgrace.
Ay, but the won! if I could have said it,
I by no terrors of bell perplext.
Hard to be silent and have no credit
From man in this world, or reward in the next,
None to bear witness and reckon the cost
Of the name that is saved by the life that ia !oat.
I must begone to the crowd untold
Of men by the cause which they served unknown,
Who moulder in myriad graves of old,
Never a story and never a stone
Tells of the martyrs who die like me
Just for the pride of the old countl:ee."
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lawyers, having a sense of professional obligation, to improve conditions. Only after another generation did this work bear fruit.
The adoption by the American Bar Association of its "Canons
of Ethics" in I908 was an event of first importance for the profession, but not because (as may sometimes have been cla..imed), this
Code was a System of Ethics, by the adoption of which lawyers
would be made good. Criminal laws failed, and professional codes
are in themselves of no greater value.
The principal reason why the "Canons of Ethics" and their adoption ·by the American Bar Association is peculiarly noteworthy, lies
in the fact that the lawyers of this Country had determined to renew the habits and to establish the traditions which have been the
mark of the Bar wherever it has retained the respect of the public.
The Canons do not contain the whole ethical duty of the lawyer.
They are confined to the simple rules of professional conduct to
. which all right minded lawyers would agree, and with which all
high minded lawyers have squared their professional conduct.
The Committee of the American Bar Association, which prepared
the "Code of Ethics" was composed of leaders of the Bar.9 Among
their number was David J. Brewer, a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. It was upon his suggestion that the Committee, in
its work, limited the scope of the Canons to "A body of rules, few
in number, clear and precise in their provisions, so that there can
be no e.."<cuse for their violation."
The Canons of Ethics were adopted, at the session of the American Bar Association held at Seattle, Washington, in August, I908,
as proposed by the Committee, an9 without substantial criticism
(See Vol. XXXIII, American Bar Association Reports, pp. 86 and
573), except as to one Canon, the language of which was modified.
By standing rule of the American Bar Association the Canons
are printed in each Annual Volume of the Reports of the Association.
These Canons have received the approval of the Courts in at
least one jurisdiction in this Country, and have been enforced,
•The names of the fourteen lawyers composing this Committee are found on page
573, A. B. A. Report 1908, being Vol. XXXIII,-not one of them but has distinguished
himself at the American Bar. The final report of· the Committee is found on pages s67
to s86 inclusive of the same volume. On page s70 is the reference to the suggestion of
Justice Brewer, etc. The discussion in open meeting of the American Bar Association,
when this report was introduced, on behalf of the Committee, by Hon. Jacob M. Dickinson,
is found on pages SS to 86 of the same volume. Of course the Canon which was the subject of criticism and discussion is that upon Contingent Fees, being Canon No. 13. In
my judgment not everything, which perhaps from the professional point of view is im·
portant, baa yet been said with reference to Canon No. 13.
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notwithstanding respondent's claim that the Canon in question was
not a part of the Statute Law of the State,
In the Matter of Adolph M. Schwarz,
161 _N. Y. Supp. 1079.

I am content to dose this article with the following brief quotations from members of the profession whose opinion is entitled to
favorable consideration:
"The Canons of Ethics are not framed to awaken the conscience but to enlighten the understanding."
HON. CHARLES A. COLLIN,
of the New York Bar.
"A right spirit is the life of professional honor, and, to him
who does not feel it rules are but words."
HON. JUDSON

s. LANDON,

late Judge N. Y. Court of Appeals.
"Rules cannot make lawyers, men of intelligence or honor."
"The -basis of all ethics is right impulses. If we make the
sordid things of life our ideals, we shall never attain unto any
degree of perfection. Money we may get, possibly high standing and temporary honor, but the professional ideals will find
no place in our life."
HON. JOHN FRANKLIN FOR'!',

of the New Jersey Bar,
late Governor of his State.
CLARENCE

Detroit.

A.

LIGHTNER.

